Agency problems and divided policies around the world:
This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call outcome minority shareholders to force corporate outsiders to disgorge cash. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher div...
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| Format: | Book |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1998
|
| Series: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6594 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | kostenfrei |
| Summary: | This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call outcome minority shareholders to force corporate outsiders to disgorge cash. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividends. On what we call substitute a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders so that firms can raise equity finance in the future. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights reduce the need for establishing a reputation, and so should be associated with lower dividends. We compare these models on a cross-section of 4,000 companies from around the world, which operate in 33 countries with different levels of shareholder protection, and therefore different strength of minority shareholder rights. The findings on payout levels and other results support the outcome agency model of dividends. |
| Physical Description: | 29 S. |
Staff View
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:22:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 29 S. |
| publishDate | 1998 |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Agency problems and divided policies around the world Rafael La Porta ... Cambridge, Mass. 1998 29 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6594 This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call outcome minority shareholders to force corporate outsiders to disgorge cash. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividends. On what we call substitute a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders so that firms can raise equity finance in the future. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights reduce the need for establishing a reputation, and so should be associated with lower dividends. We compare these models on a cross-section of 4,000 companies from around the world, which operate in 33 countries with different levels of shareholder protection, and therefore different strength of minority shareholder rights. The findings on payout levels and other results support the outcome agency model of dividends. Ökonometrisches Modell Dividends Econometric models Stocks Econometric models La Porta, Rafael Sonstige (DE-588)124078648 oth Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6594 (DE-604)BV002801238 6594 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6594.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Agency problems and divided policies around the world National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Dividends Econometric models Stocks Econometric models |
| title | Agency problems and divided policies around the world |
| title_auth | Agency problems and divided policies around the world |
| title_exact_search | Agency problems and divided policies around the world |
| title_full | Agency problems and divided policies around the world Rafael La Porta ... |
| title_fullStr | Agency problems and divided policies around the world Rafael La Porta ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Agency problems and divided policies around the world Rafael La Porta ... |
| title_short | Agency problems and divided policies around the world |
| title_sort | agency problems and divided policies around the world |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Dividends Econometric models Stocks Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Dividends Econometric models Stocks Econometric models |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6594.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT laportarafael agencyproblemsanddividedpoliciesaroundtheworld |