Nonprofit production and competition:
Industries in which private nonprofit production is present and significant, such as health care and education, account for more than one-fifth of US economic activity. This paper argues thatprevious analysis of nonprofits has not separated profit-deviating preferences from the state-defined regulat...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1998
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6377 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | Industries in which private nonprofit production is present and significant, such as health care and education, account for more than one-fifth of US economic activity. This paper argues thatprevious analysis of nonprofits has not separated profit-deviating preferences from the state-defined regulatory status of nonprofit production. We argue that this separation is crucial in providing predictions about the underlying forces which allow the coexistence of nonprofit and for-profit production in an industry, as well as predictions about such fundamental matters as the share of nonprofit activity. By separating choice of nonprofit status from profit-deviating preferences, the paper provides predictions about the forces which determine the share of nonprofit production in an industry. We argue that this share falls with the share of the demand that is publicly subsidized, rises with the total number of firms in the industry, and rises with growth in the pace or extent of cost-reductions resulting from learning-by-doing. These predictions stem from a basic aspect of regulatory nonprofit choice which links the degree of competition in a market with the share of nonprofits: the availability of economic profits under for-profit status raises the cost of choosing nonprofit status when such a status is. |
| Beschreibung: | 44 S. graph. Darst. |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6377 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Industries in which private nonprofit production is present and significant, such as health care and education, account for more than one-fifth of US economic activity. This paper argues thatprevious analysis of nonprofits has not separated profit-deviating preferences from the state-defined regulatory status of nonprofit production. We argue that this separation is crucial in providing predictions about the underlying forces which allow the coexistence of nonprofit and for-profit production in an industry, as well as predictions about such fundamental matters as the share of nonprofit activity. By separating choice of nonprofit status from profit-deviating preferences, the paper provides predictions about the forces which determine the share of nonprofit production in an industry. We argue that this share falls with the share of the demand that is publicly subsidized, rises with the total number of firms in the industry, and rises with growth in the pace or extent of cost-reductions resulting from learning-by-doing. These predictions stem from a basic aspect of regulatory nonprofit choice which links the degree of competition in a market with the share of nonprofits: the availability of economic profits under for-profit status raises the cost of choosing nonprofit status when such a status is. | |
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| id | DE-604.BV011900050 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:18:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008041421 |
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| physical | 44 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publishDateSearch | 1998 |
| publishDateSort | 1998 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Lakdawalla, Darius Verfasser aut Nonprofit production and competition Darius Lakdawalla ; Tomas Philipson Cambridge, Mass. 1998 44 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6377 Industries in which private nonprofit production is present and significant, such as health care and education, account for more than one-fifth of US economic activity. This paper argues thatprevious analysis of nonprofits has not separated profit-deviating preferences from the state-defined regulatory status of nonprofit production. We argue that this separation is crucial in providing predictions about the underlying forces which allow the coexistence of nonprofit and for-profit production in an industry, as well as predictions about such fundamental matters as the share of nonprofit activity. By separating choice of nonprofit status from profit-deviating preferences, the paper provides predictions about the forces which determine the share of nonprofit production in an industry. We argue that this share falls with the share of the demand that is publicly subsidized, rises with the total number of firms in the industry, and rises with growth in the pace or extent of cost-reductions resulting from learning-by-doing. These predictions stem from a basic aspect of regulatory nonprofit choice which links the degree of competition in a market with the share of nonprofits: the availability of economic profits under for-profit status raises the cost of choosing nonprofit status when such a status is. Associations sans but lucratif ram Concurrence ram Production ram Competition Nonprofit organizations Production (Economic theory) Philipson, Tomas J. Verfasser aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6377 (DE-604)BV002801238 6377 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6377.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Lakdawalla, Darius Philipson, Tomas J. Nonprofit production and competition National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Associations sans but lucratif ram Concurrence ram Production ram Competition Nonprofit organizations Production (Economic theory) |
| title | Nonprofit production and competition |
| title_auth | Nonprofit production and competition |
| title_exact_search | Nonprofit production and competition |
| title_full | Nonprofit production and competition Darius Lakdawalla ; Tomas Philipson |
| title_fullStr | Nonprofit production and competition Darius Lakdawalla ; Tomas Philipson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Nonprofit production and competition Darius Lakdawalla ; Tomas Philipson |
| title_short | Nonprofit production and competition |
| title_sort | nonprofit production and competition |
| topic | Associations sans but lucratif ram Concurrence ram Production ram Competition Nonprofit organizations Production (Economic theory) |
| topic_facet | Associations sans but lucratif Concurrence Production Competition Nonprofit organizations Production (Economic theory) |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6377.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lakdawalladarius nonprofitproductionandcompetition AT philipsontomasj nonprofitproductionandcompetition |