What minds can do: intentionality in a non-intentional world

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jacob, Pierre (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 1997
Edition:1. publ.
Series:Cambridge studies in philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:Inhaltsverzeichnis
Summary:Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and language, cognitive science, and psychology.
Physical Description:XII, 299 S.
ISBN:0521574013
0521574366

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