The mechanisms of governance:
This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York [u.a.]
Oxford Univ. Press
1996
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Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization - firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus - are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing |
Beschreibung: | XII, 429 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 0195078241 9780195132601 |
Internformat
MARC
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264 | 1 | |a New York [u.a.] |b Oxford Univ. Press |c 1996 | |
300 | |a XII, 429 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | 3 | |a This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization - firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus - are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance | |
520 | |a Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing | ||
650 | 7 | |a CORPORATE PLANNING |2 unbist | |
650 | 7 | |a COST EFFECTIVENESS |2 unbist | |
650 | 4 | |a Costos de operación | |
650 | 4 | |a Coûts de transaction | |
650 | 7 | |a GOVERNANCE |2 unbist | |
650 | 4 | |a Gobierno corporativo | |
650 | 4 | |a Gouvernement d'entreprise | |
650 | 7 | |a INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION |2 unbist | |
650 | 7 | |a Industriële organisatie |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Institutionalisme |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Transactiekosten |2 gtt | |
650 | 4 | |a Économie industrielle | |
650 | 4 | |a Industrial organization (Economic theory) | |
650 | 4 | |a Corporate governance | |
650 | 4 | |a Transaction costs | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Organisation |0 (DE-588)4043774-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Corporate Governance |0 (DE-588)4419850-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Unternehmen |0 (DE-588)4061963-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Transaktionskostenansatz |0 (DE-588)4206592-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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689 | 1 | 1 | |a Organisation |0 (DE-588)4043774-7 |D s |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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---|---|
any_adam_object | |
author | Williamson, Oliver E. 1932-2020 |
author_GND | (DE-588)124179045 |
author_facet | Williamson, Oliver E. 1932-2020 |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Williamson, Oliver E. 1932-2020 |
author_variant | o e w oe oew |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV011029690 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HD2326 |
callnumber-raw | HD2326.W494 1996 |
callnumber-search | HD2326.W494 1996 |
callnumber-sort | HD 42326 W494 41996 |
callnumber-subject | HD - Industries, Land Use, Labor |
classification_rvk | QP 341 |
classification_tum | WIR 050f |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)32166380 (DE-599)BVBBV011029690 |
dewey-full | 658.420 658.4 |
dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
dewey-raw | 658.4 20 658.4 |
dewey-search | 658.4 20 658.4 |
dewey-sort | 3658.4 220 |
dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV011029690 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:02:51Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0195078241 9780195132601 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007385317 |
oclc_num | 32166380 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-20 DE-945 DE-29 DE-N2 DE-703 DE-521 DE-634 DE-11 DE-188 |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-20 DE-945 DE-29 DE-N2 DE-703 DE-521 DE-634 DE-11 DE-188 |
physical | XII, 429 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 1996 |
publishDateSearch | 1996 |
publishDateSort | 1996 |
publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Williamson, Oliver E. 1932-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)124179045 aut The mechanisms of governance Oliver E. Williamson New York [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 1996 XII, 429 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization - firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus - are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing CORPORATE PLANNING unbist COST EFFECTIVENESS unbist Costos de operación Coûts de transaction GOVERNANCE unbist Gobierno corporativo Gouvernement d'entreprise INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION unbist Industriële organisatie gtt Institutionalisme gtt Transactiekosten gtt Économie industrielle Industrial organization (Economic theory) Corporate governance Transaction costs Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd rswk-swf Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Transaktionskostenansatz (DE-588)4206592-6 gnd rswk-swf Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s Transaktionskostenansatz (DE-588)4206592-6 s DE-604 Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 s |
spellingShingle | Williamson, Oliver E. 1932-2020 The mechanisms of governance CORPORATE PLANNING unbist COST EFFECTIVENESS unbist Costos de operación Coûts de transaction GOVERNANCE unbist Gobierno corporativo Gouvernement d'entreprise INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION unbist Industriële organisatie gtt Institutionalisme gtt Transactiekosten gtt Économie industrielle Industrial organization (Economic theory) Corporate governance Transaction costs Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Transaktionskostenansatz (DE-588)4206592-6 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4043774-7 (DE-588)4419850-4 (DE-588)4061963-1 (DE-588)4206592-6 |
title | The mechanisms of governance |
title_auth | The mechanisms of governance |
title_exact_search | The mechanisms of governance |
title_full | The mechanisms of governance Oliver E. Williamson |
title_fullStr | The mechanisms of governance Oliver E. Williamson |
title_full_unstemmed | The mechanisms of governance Oliver E. Williamson |
title_short | The mechanisms of governance |
title_sort | the mechanisms of governance |
topic | CORPORATE PLANNING unbist COST EFFECTIVENESS unbist Costos de operación Coûts de transaction GOVERNANCE unbist Gobierno corporativo Gouvernement d'entreprise INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION unbist Industriële organisatie gtt Institutionalisme gtt Transactiekosten gtt Économie industrielle Industrial organization (Economic theory) Corporate governance Transaction costs Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Transaktionskostenansatz (DE-588)4206592-6 gnd |
topic_facet | CORPORATE PLANNING COST EFFECTIVENESS Costos de operación Coûts de transaction GOVERNANCE Gobierno corporativo Gouvernement d'entreprise INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Industriële organisatie Institutionalisme Transactiekosten Économie industrielle Industrial organization (Economic theory) Corporate governance Transaction costs Organisation Corporate Governance Unternehmen Transaktionskostenansatz |
work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsonolivere themechanismsofgovernance |