A pragmatic theory of fallacy:
Although many individual fallacies have now been studied and analyzed in the growing literature on argumentation, the concept of fallacy itself has lacked a sufficiently clear meaning to make it as useful as it could be for evaluating arguments. Walton looks at how an argument is used in the context...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Tuscaloosa [u.a.]
Univ. of Alabama Press
1995
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Schriftenreihe: | Studies in rhetoric and communication
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | Although many individual fallacies have now been studied and analyzed in the growing literature on argumentation, the concept of fallacy itself has lacked a sufficiently clear meaning to make it as useful as it could be for evaluating arguments. Walton looks at how an argument is used in the context of conversation. He defines a fallacy as a conversational move, or sequence of moves, that is supposed to be an argument that contributes to the purpose of the conversation but in reality interferes with it. The view is a pragmatic one, based on the assumption that when people argue, they do so in a context of dialogue, a conventionalized normative framework that is goal-directed. Such a contextual framework is shown to be crucial in determining whether an argument has been used correctly. Three problems are those of fallacy identification, fallacy analysis, and fallacy evaluation Walton presents solutions for all three problems by developing new pragmatic structures to display the form of an argument (the so-called argumentation scheme). The fallacy is revealed when it is shown, in a given case, how its form fits into an enveloping normative structure of dialogue. In this book Walton shows how the 25 or so major informal fallacies standardly treated in textbooks are basically reasonable presumptive types of arguments that have been used inappropriately in such a normative model. Another key feature of the book is its demonstration that a fallacy is typically an argument that seems correct when it is not. Walton shows that such an argument is used in a way that disguises a covert, illicit shift from one type of dialogue to another. This novel approach to solving the analysis problem provides a pragmatic way of analyzing a fallacy as a deceptive type of argumentation with an appearance of correctness Walton suggests that different contexts of dialogue are involved and that fallacies are often associated with a partially concealed illicit shift from one type of dialogue to another |
Beschreibung: | XIV, 324 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 0817307982 |
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520 | 3 | |a Although many individual fallacies have now been studied and analyzed in the growing literature on argumentation, the concept of fallacy itself has lacked a sufficiently clear meaning to make it as useful as it could be for evaluating arguments. Walton looks at how an argument is used in the context of conversation. He defines a fallacy as a conversational move, or sequence of moves, that is supposed to be an argument that contributes to the purpose of the conversation but in reality interferes with it. The view is a pragmatic one, based on the assumption that when people argue, they do so in a context of dialogue, a conventionalized normative framework that is goal-directed. Such a contextual framework is shown to be crucial in determining whether an argument has been used correctly. Three problems are those of fallacy identification, fallacy analysis, and fallacy evaluation | |
520 | 3 | |a Walton presents solutions for all three problems by developing new pragmatic structures to display the form of an argument (the so-called argumentation scheme). The fallacy is revealed when it is shown, in a given case, how its form fits into an enveloping normative structure of dialogue. In this book Walton shows how the 25 or so major informal fallacies standardly treated in textbooks are basically reasonable presumptive types of arguments that have been used inappropriately in such a normative model. Another key feature of the book is its demonstration that a fallacy is typically an argument that seems correct when it is not. Walton shows that such an argument is used in a way that disguises a covert, illicit shift from one type of dialogue to another. This novel approach to solving the analysis problem provides a pragmatic way of analyzing a fallacy as a deceptive type of argumentation with an appearance of correctness | |
520 | 3 | |a Walton suggests that different contexts of dialogue are involved and that fallacies are often associated with a partially concealed illicit shift from one type of dialogue to another | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Douglas Walton
A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy
The University of Alabama Press Tuscaloosa and London
Contents
Preface xi
Chapter One: The Concept of Fallacy 1
1 Greek Roots of the Concept of Fallacy 1
2 Informal Logic as Dialectical 3
3 State of the Art of Dialogue Logic 6
4 Fallacies and Violations of Rules 10
5 The New Approach to Fallacies 14
6 When Is a Fallacy Really a Fallacy? 16
7 Persuasion Dialogue 18
8 Profiles of Dialogue 22
9 Argumentation Tactics 26
10 Standards of Evaluation 31
Chapter Two: Informal Fallacies 35
1 Ad Hominem 36
2 Ad Baculum, ad Populum, and ad Miseiicoidiam 40
3 Ad Ignoiantiam 43
4 Ad Veiecundiam 46
5 Complex Question 48
6 Begging the Question 49
7 Hasty Generalization 52
8 Slippery Slope 54
Contents / vii
9 False Cause 56
10 Straw Man 57
11 Argument from Consequences 58
12 Faulty Analogy 60
13 Linguistic Fallacies 61
14 Ignoiatio Elenchi 65
15 Conclusions 67
Chapter Three: Formal Fallacies 69
1 Affirming the Consequent 70
2 Invalidity and Fallacy 73
3 Consequent as Fallacy 76
4 Scope Confusion Fallacies 79
5 Inconsistency 81
6 Composition and Division 84
7 Inductive Fallacies 88
8 Types of Arguments 90
9 Fallacies and Logical Form 94
10 Fallacies as Failures of Use 96
Chapter Four: Types of Dialogue 98
1 The Critical Discussion 99
2 The Negotiation 103
3 The Inquiry 106
4 The Quarrel 109
5 Information-Seeking Dialogue 113
6 Deliberation 116
7 Dialectical Shifts 118
8 Illicit Dialectical Shifts 120
9 Double Deceptions 123
10 Mixed Dialogues 126
Chapter Five: Argumentation Schemes 130
1 Presumptive Reasoning 132
2 Case-Based Reasoning 134
3 Verbal Classification 137
4 Causal Reasoning 140
5 Commitment-Based Reasoning 143
6 Rule-Based Reasoning 146
7 Position-to-Know Reasoning 149
8 Source Indicators Reasoning 152
9 Practical Reasoning 155
10 Gradualistic Reasoning 158
viii / Contents
Chapter Six: Dialectical Relevance of Argumentation 162
1 A Classic Case Introduced 164
2 Dialectical Relevance as a Pragmatic Concept 170
3 Contexts of Dialogue 173
4 Failure to Answer a Question 177
5 The Global Roots of Local Relevance 180
6 Hard Judgments of Global Relevance 182
7 Making a Big Issue of Something 185
8 The Classic Case Reconsidered 188
9 The Wastebasket Category 190
10 The Importance of Relevance for Fallacy Theory 195
Chapter Seven: A New Approach to Fallacies 199
1 Argumentation Schemes and Themes 200
2 The Fallacy of Many Questions 202
3 Begging the Question 205
4 Fallacy Names 208
5 Classifying ad Hominem Arguments 212
6 The ad Hominem Fallacy 215
7 The ad Baculum Fallacy 218
8 The ad Miseiicoidiam Fallacy 221
9 The ad Populum Fallacy 224
10 Toward a Theory of Fallacy 228
Chapter Eight: A Theory of Fallacy 232
1 What a Fallacy Is Not 233
2 Six Basic Characteristics of Fallacy 237
3 A Fallacy Is an Illusion or Deception 240
4 A Dilemma for Fallacy Theory 244
5 Sophistical Tactics 249
6 The New Definition of Fallacy 254
7 Properties of the New Concept of Fallacy 257
8 The Charge of Fallacy 262
9 The Balancing Aspect of Argumentation 266
10 The Dilemma for Fallacy Theory Revisited 269
Chapter Nine: Putting the Theory to Work 273
1 The ad Ignoiantiam Fallacy 274
2 Ad Veiecundiam as a Fallacy 278
3 Argumentation from Consequences 284
4 The Slippery Slope Fallacy 286
5 The Fallacy of Secundum Quid 288
6 The Straw Man Fallacy 290
Contents / ix
7 Equivocation 291
8 Amphiboly 293
9 Accent 295
10 Fallacies and Violations of Rules 297
Notes 305
References 311
Index 319
x / Contents
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Walton, Douglas N. 1942-2020 |
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dewey-full | 165 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 165 - Fallacies and sources of error |
dewey-raw | 165 |
dewey-search | 165 |
dewey-sort | 3165 |
dewey-tens | 160 - Philosophical logic |
discipline | Sprachwissenschaft Philosophie Literaturwissenschaft |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV010502008 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T17:53:35Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0817307982 |
language | English |
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physical | XIV, 324 S. graph. Darst. |
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spelling | Walton, Douglas N. 1942-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)177903198 aut A pragmatic theory of fallacy Douglas Walton Tuscaloosa [u.a.] Univ. of Alabama Press 1995 XIV, 324 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Studies in rhetoric and communication Although many individual fallacies have now been studied and analyzed in the growing literature on argumentation, the concept of fallacy itself has lacked a sufficiently clear meaning to make it as useful as it could be for evaluating arguments. Walton looks at how an argument is used in the context of conversation. He defines a fallacy as a conversational move, or sequence of moves, that is supposed to be an argument that contributes to the purpose of the conversation but in reality interferes with it. The view is a pragmatic one, based on the assumption that when people argue, they do so in a context of dialogue, a conventionalized normative framework that is goal-directed. Such a contextual framework is shown to be crucial in determining whether an argument has been used correctly. Three problems are those of fallacy identification, fallacy analysis, and fallacy evaluation Walton presents solutions for all three problems by developing new pragmatic structures to display the form of an argument (the so-called argumentation scheme). The fallacy is revealed when it is shown, in a given case, how its form fits into an enveloping normative structure of dialogue. In this book Walton shows how the 25 or so major informal fallacies standardly treated in textbooks are basically reasonable presumptive types of arguments that have been used inappropriately in such a normative model. Another key feature of the book is its demonstration that a fallacy is typically an argument that seems correct when it is not. Walton shows that such an argument is used in a way that disguises a covert, illicit shift from one type of dialogue to another. This novel approach to solving the analysis problem provides a pragmatic way of analyzing a fallacy as a deceptive type of argumentation with an appearance of correctness Walton suggests that different contexts of dialogue are involved and that fallacies are often associated with a partially concealed illicit shift from one type of dialogue to another Argumentatieleer gtt Drogredenen gtt Sophismes Fallacies (Logic) Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Fehlschluss (DE-588)4132069-4 gnd rswk-swf Fehlschluss (DE-588)4132069-4 s Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s DE-604 HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006998672&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Walton, Douglas N. 1942-2020 A pragmatic theory of fallacy Argumentatieleer gtt Drogredenen gtt Sophismes Fallacies (Logic) Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Fehlschluss (DE-588)4132069-4 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4132069-4 |
title | A pragmatic theory of fallacy |
title_auth | A pragmatic theory of fallacy |
title_exact_search | A pragmatic theory of fallacy |
title_full | A pragmatic theory of fallacy Douglas Walton |
title_fullStr | A pragmatic theory of fallacy Douglas Walton |
title_full_unstemmed | A pragmatic theory of fallacy Douglas Walton |
title_short | A pragmatic theory of fallacy |
title_sort | a pragmatic theory of fallacy |
topic | Argumentatieleer gtt Drogredenen gtt Sophismes Fallacies (Logic) Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Fehlschluss (DE-588)4132069-4 gnd |
topic_facet | Argumentatieleer Drogredenen Sophismes Fallacies (Logic) Theorie Fehlschluss |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006998672&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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