Value Chains and WTO Disputes: Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cham
Springer International Publishing AG
2020
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Schlagworte: | |
Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (171 pages) |
ISBN: | 9783030490942 |
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505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Cooperation and Discord in the International Trade Regime -- 1.2 The Puzzle -- 1.3 Proposed Explanations and the Argument in Brief -- 1.4 The Structure of the Book -- References -- 2 Theorizing Cooperation in International Trade and the WTO DSM -- 2.1 State of the Art: Situating the Study in a Broader Context -- 2.1.1 What Has Been Said About WTO Members Behavior at the DSM? -- 2.2 The Argument: Value Chains, Firms, and Compliance -- 2.2.1 Firms in Trade Policymaking -- 2.2.2 Integration into Value Chains and Firms' Preferences -- 2.2.3 WTO Dispute Settlement System in Brief -- 2.2.4 Containing Protectionist Interests and Overcoming Resistance to Compliance -- 2.2.5 Why Do Trade Barriers Get Erected in the First Place? -- 2.3 The Empirical Approach -- References -- 3 Explaining Patterns of WTO Member Behavior at the WTO Dispute Settlement -- References -- 4 Firms, Coalitions, and WTO Disputes: Domestic Private Actors in the WTO -- 4.1 The Role of Firms in WTO Members' Responses to Litigation and the Impact of Affected Firms' Integration into Value Chains -- 4.2 US Responses to Litigation -- 4.2.1 The US' Swift Compliance with Panel Rulings -- 4.2.2 The US's Delayed Compliance Despite a "Simple" Form of Implementation -- 4.3 Canada's Response to WTO Litigation -- 4.3.1 Canada's Delayed Compliance with Protectionist Pressures and a Complex Form of Implementation -- 4.3.2 Canada's Swift Implementation in the Face of Complexity -- References -- 5 Conclusion -- 5.1 Main Findings and the Contributions -- 5.2 Twenty-First-Century Trade Tensions in the Context of Value Chains -- References -- Appendix A: Supplementary Analysis for Cox Regression -- Measuring Time to Compliance and Power Asymmetry | |
505 | 8 | |a Appendix B: The Details of the Disputes and the Corresponding Domestic Policy That Brought Compliance -- Calculation of Compliance from Different Perspectives -- WTO Panel Stage and Possible Compliance Options Employed in the Study (Different Visualization) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Parliament (Alignel1) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Council (Alignel2) -- Alignment of the Parliament and the Council (Alignl1l2) -- Legislative Fractionalization -- Law and Order -- References -- Index | |
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author | Yildirim, Aydin Baris |
author_facet | Yildirim, Aydin Baris |
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author_sort | Yildirim, Aydin Baris |
author_variant | a b y ab aby |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV048222927 |
collection | ZDB-30-PQE |
contents | Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Cooperation and Discord in the International Trade Regime -- 1.2 The Puzzle -- 1.3 Proposed Explanations and the Argument in Brief -- 1.4 The Structure of the Book -- References -- 2 Theorizing Cooperation in International Trade and the WTO DSM -- 2.1 State of the Art: Situating the Study in a Broader Context -- 2.1.1 What Has Been Said About WTO Members Behavior at the DSM? -- 2.2 The Argument: Value Chains, Firms, and Compliance -- 2.2.1 Firms in Trade Policymaking -- 2.2.2 Integration into Value Chains and Firms' Preferences -- 2.2.3 WTO Dispute Settlement System in Brief -- 2.2.4 Containing Protectionist Interests and Overcoming Resistance to Compliance -- 2.2.5 Why Do Trade Barriers Get Erected in the First Place? -- 2.3 The Empirical Approach -- References -- 3 Explaining Patterns of WTO Member Behavior at the WTO Dispute Settlement -- References -- 4 Firms, Coalitions, and WTO Disputes: Domestic Private Actors in the WTO -- 4.1 The Role of Firms in WTO Members' Responses to Litigation and the Impact of Affected Firms' Integration into Value Chains -- 4.2 US Responses to Litigation -- 4.2.1 The US' Swift Compliance with Panel Rulings -- 4.2.2 The US's Delayed Compliance Despite a "Simple" Form of Implementation -- 4.3 Canada's Response to WTO Litigation -- 4.3.1 Canada's Delayed Compliance with Protectionist Pressures and a Complex Form of Implementation -- 4.3.2 Canada's Swift Implementation in the Face of Complexity -- References -- 5 Conclusion -- 5.1 Main Findings and the Contributions -- 5.2 Twenty-First-Century Trade Tensions in the Context of Value Chains -- References -- Appendix A: Supplementary Analysis for Cox Regression -- Measuring Time to Compliance and Power Asymmetry Appendix B: The Details of the Disputes and the Corresponding Domestic Policy That Brought Compliance -- Calculation of Compliance from Different Perspectives -- WTO Panel Stage and Possible Compliance Options Employed in the Study (Different Visualization) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Parliament (Alignel1) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Council (Alignel2) -- Alignment of the Parliament and the Council (Alignl1l2) -- Legislative Fractionalization -- Law and Order -- References -- Index |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-30-PQE)EBC6247258 (ZDB-30-PAD)EBC6247258 (ZDB-89-EBL)EBL6247258 (OCoLC)1190686502 (DE-599)BVBBV048222927 |
dewey-full | 382.92 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 382 - International commerce (Foreign trade) |
dewey-raw | 382.92 |
dewey-search | 382.92 |
dewey-sort | 3382.92 |
dewey-tens | 380 - Commerce, communications, transportation |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
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spelling | Yildirim, Aydin Baris Verfasser aut Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism Cham Springer International Publishing AG 2020 ©2020 1 Online-Ressource (171 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Cooperation and Discord in the International Trade Regime -- 1.2 The Puzzle -- 1.3 Proposed Explanations and the Argument in Brief -- 1.4 The Structure of the Book -- References -- 2 Theorizing Cooperation in International Trade and the WTO DSM -- 2.1 State of the Art: Situating the Study in a Broader Context -- 2.1.1 What Has Been Said About WTO Members Behavior at the DSM? -- 2.2 The Argument: Value Chains, Firms, and Compliance -- 2.2.1 Firms in Trade Policymaking -- 2.2.2 Integration into Value Chains and Firms' Preferences -- 2.2.3 WTO Dispute Settlement System in Brief -- 2.2.4 Containing Protectionist Interests and Overcoming Resistance to Compliance -- 2.2.5 Why Do Trade Barriers Get Erected in the First Place? -- 2.3 The Empirical Approach -- References -- 3 Explaining Patterns of WTO Member Behavior at the WTO Dispute Settlement -- References -- 4 Firms, Coalitions, and WTO Disputes: Domestic Private Actors in the WTO -- 4.1 The Role of Firms in WTO Members' Responses to Litigation and the Impact of Affected Firms' Integration into Value Chains -- 4.2 US Responses to Litigation -- 4.2.1 The US' Swift Compliance with Panel Rulings -- 4.2.2 The US's Delayed Compliance Despite a "Simple" Form of Implementation -- 4.3 Canada's Response to WTO Litigation -- 4.3.1 Canada's Delayed Compliance with Protectionist Pressures and a Complex Form of Implementation -- 4.3.2 Canada's Swift Implementation in the Face of Complexity -- References -- 5 Conclusion -- 5.1 Main Findings and the Contributions -- 5.2 Twenty-First-Century Trade Tensions in the Context of Value Chains -- References -- Appendix A: Supplementary Analysis for Cox Regression -- Measuring Time to Compliance and Power Asymmetry Appendix B: The Details of the Disputes and the Corresponding Domestic Policy That Brought Compliance -- Calculation of Compliance from Different Perspectives -- WTO Panel Stage and Possible Compliance Options Employed in the Study (Different Visualization) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Parliament (Alignel1) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Council (Alignel2) -- Alignment of the Parliament and the Council (Alignl1l2) -- Legislative Fractionalization -- Law and Order -- References -- Index World Trade Organization Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Yildirim, Aydin Baris Value Chains and WTO Disputes Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020 9783030490935 |
spellingShingle | Yildirim, Aydin Baris Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Cooperation and Discord in the International Trade Regime -- 1.2 The Puzzle -- 1.3 Proposed Explanations and the Argument in Brief -- 1.4 The Structure of the Book -- References -- 2 Theorizing Cooperation in International Trade and the WTO DSM -- 2.1 State of the Art: Situating the Study in a Broader Context -- 2.1.1 What Has Been Said About WTO Members Behavior at the DSM? -- 2.2 The Argument: Value Chains, Firms, and Compliance -- 2.2.1 Firms in Trade Policymaking -- 2.2.2 Integration into Value Chains and Firms' Preferences -- 2.2.3 WTO Dispute Settlement System in Brief -- 2.2.4 Containing Protectionist Interests and Overcoming Resistance to Compliance -- 2.2.5 Why Do Trade Barriers Get Erected in the First Place? -- 2.3 The Empirical Approach -- References -- 3 Explaining Patterns of WTO Member Behavior at the WTO Dispute Settlement -- References -- 4 Firms, Coalitions, and WTO Disputes: Domestic Private Actors in the WTO -- 4.1 The Role of Firms in WTO Members' Responses to Litigation and the Impact of Affected Firms' Integration into Value Chains -- 4.2 US Responses to Litigation -- 4.2.1 The US' Swift Compliance with Panel Rulings -- 4.2.2 The US's Delayed Compliance Despite a "Simple" Form of Implementation -- 4.3 Canada's Response to WTO Litigation -- 4.3.1 Canada's Delayed Compliance with Protectionist Pressures and a Complex Form of Implementation -- 4.3.2 Canada's Swift Implementation in the Face of Complexity -- References -- 5 Conclusion -- 5.1 Main Findings and the Contributions -- 5.2 Twenty-First-Century Trade Tensions in the Context of Value Chains -- References -- Appendix A: Supplementary Analysis for Cox Regression -- Measuring Time to Compliance and Power Asymmetry Appendix B: The Details of the Disputes and the Corresponding Domestic Policy That Brought Compliance -- Calculation of Compliance from Different Perspectives -- WTO Panel Stage and Possible Compliance Options Employed in the Study (Different Visualization) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Parliament (Alignel1) -- Alignment of the Executive and the Council (Alignel2) -- Alignment of the Parliament and the Council (Alignl1l2) -- Legislative Fractionalization -- Law and Order -- References -- Index World Trade Organization |
title | Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
title_auth | Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
title_exact_search | Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
title_exact_search_txtP | Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
title_full | Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
title_fullStr | Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
title_full_unstemmed | Value Chains and WTO Disputes Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
title_short | Value Chains and WTO Disputes |
title_sort | value chains and wto disputes compliance at the dispute settlement mechanism |
title_sub | Compliance at the Dispute Settlement Mechanism |
topic | World Trade Organization |
topic_facet | World Trade Organization |
work_keys_str_mv | AT yildirimaydinbaris valuechainsandwtodisputescomplianceatthedisputesettlementmechanism |