"Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction: voluntary decentralization in environmental policy
Under most U.S. environmental laws and some health and safety laws, states may apply to implement and enforce the law, through a process known as authorization or primacy. The paper presents a simple model of the strategic interaction between the federal and state governments with such voluntary dec...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13238 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Under most U.S. environmental laws and some health and safety laws, states may apply to implement and enforce the law, through a process known as authorization or primacy. The paper presents a simple model of the strategic interaction between the federal and state governments with such voluntary decentralization. The model suggests that the federal government may design the policy so that states that desire stringent regulation authorize, whereas other states remain under the federal program. We then test the implications of this model using data on U.S. water pollution and hazardous waste regulations, two of the most important environmental programs to allow authorization. Consistent with the results of our model, we find that states with stronger environmental preferences authorize more quickly and more fully under both policies. This evidence runs counter to concerns that states use control of their programs to undercut federal environmental standards. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29 |
| Beschreibung: | 38 S. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 520 | 8 | |a Under most U.S. environmental laws and some health and safety laws, states may apply to implement and enforce the law, through a process known as authorization or primacy. The paper presents a simple model of the strategic interaction between the federal and state governments with such voluntary decentralization. The model suggests that the federal government may design the policy so that states that desire stringent regulation authorize, whereas other states remain under the federal program. We then test the implications of this model using data on U.S. water pollution and hazardous waste regulations, two of the most important environmental programs to allow authorization. Consistent with the results of our model, we find that states with stronger environmental preferences authorize more quickly and more fully under both policies. This evidence runs counter to concerns that states use control of their programs to undercut federal environmental standards. | |
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| id | DE-604.BV023593144 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 38 S. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
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| spelling | Traub, Leah G. Verfasser (DE-588)133485374 aut "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy Leah G. Traub ; Hilary Sigman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 38 S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13238 Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29 Under most U.S. environmental laws and some health and safety laws, states may apply to implement and enforce the law, through a process known as authorization or primacy. The paper presents a simple model of the strategic interaction between the federal and state governments with such voluntary decentralization. The model suggests that the federal government may design the policy so that states that desire stringent regulation authorize, whereas other states remain under the federal program. We then test the implications of this model using data on U.S. water pollution and hazardous waste regulations, two of the most important environmental programs to allow authorization. Consistent with the results of our model, we find that states with stronger environmental preferences authorize more quickly and more fully under both policies. This evidence runs counter to concerns that states use control of their programs to undercut federal environmental standards. Sigman, Hilary 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)129563706 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13238 (DE-604)BV002801238 13238 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13238.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Traub, Leah G. Sigman, Hilary 1964- "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy |
| title | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy |
| title_auth | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy |
| title_exact_search | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy |
| title_full | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy Leah G. Traub ; Hilary Sigman |
| title_fullStr | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy Leah G. Traub ; Hilary Sigman |
| title_full_unstemmed | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy Leah G. Traub ; Hilary Sigman |
| title_short | "Cooperative federalism" as a strategic interaction |
| title_sort | cooperative federalism as a strategic interaction voluntary decentralization in environmental policy |
| title_sub | voluntary decentralization in environmental policy |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13238.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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