Ruling elites' rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights

We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites ́asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites ́concern about the security of their own ass...

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Hauptverfasser: Poliščuk, Leonid (VerfasserIn), Syunyaev, Georgiy (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Regensburg Inst. für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung 2014
Ausgabe:[Stand:] July 2014
Schriftenreihe:IOS working papers 343
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Online-Zugang:http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_343.pdf
Zusammenfassung:We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites ́asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites ́concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 26-30
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (v, 34 S.) graph. Darst.
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