Optimal unemployment insurance:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Tübingen
Mohr Siebeck
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft
[3. Folge],24 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | IX, 178 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9783161493041 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV022443084 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20191002 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070529s2007 gw d||| m||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 015 | |a 07,N20,0585 |2 dnb | ||
| 016 | 7 | |a 98395383X |2 DE-101 | |
| 020 | |a 9783161493041 |c Ln. : EUR 79.00 (freier Pr.) |9 978-3-16-149304-1 | ||
| 024 | 3 | |a 9783161493041 | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)133047947 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)DNB98395383X | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a gw |c XA-DE-BW | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-384 |a DE-355 |a DE-29 |a DE-19 |a DE-521 |a DE-M382 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HD7095 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 368.4401 |2 22/ger | |
| 084 | |a QX 600 |0 (DE-625)142184: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a 360 |2 sdnb | ||
| 084 | |a 330 |2 sdnb | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Pollak, Andreas |d 1978- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)13312424X |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Optimal unemployment insurance |c Andreas Pollak |
| 264 | 1 | |a Tübingen |b Mohr Siebeck |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a IX, 178 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft |v [3. Folge],24 | |
| 502 | |a Zugl.: Freiburg, Univ., Diss., 2006 | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Unemployment insurance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Unemployment insurance |x Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Agency-Theorie |0 (DE-588)4126353-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Adverse Selektion |0 (DE-588)4382291-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Arbeitsmarkttheorie |0 (DE-588)4122827-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Arbeitslosenversicherung |0 (DE-588)4137265-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Moral Hazard |0 (DE-588)4322425-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |a Hochschulschrift |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Arbeitslosenversicherung |0 (DE-588)4137265-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Arbeitsmarkttheorie |0 (DE-588)4122827-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Agency-Theorie |0 (DE-588)4126353-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Moral Hazard |0 (DE-588)4322425-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Adverse Selektion |0 (DE-588)4382291-5 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft |v [3. Folge],24 |w (DE-604)BV021455684 |9 200024 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung UB Regensburg |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung UB Regensburg |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Klappentext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015651099 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804136520004665344 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Table
Chapter
1.1
1.2
Chapter
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
Chapter
and Human Capital
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.4
3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2 Hartz
3.5.3
3.6
Chapter
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.3
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.4
Chapter
Equilibrium Model
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.1.5
5.1.6
5.1.7
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.2.5
5.3
Chapter
6.1
6.2
Appendix
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
Table of
References
Author
Index
Designing a
insurance scheme is a delicate matter.
In a system with no or little in¬
surance, households may be subject
to a high income risk, whereas ex¬
cessively generous unemployment
insurance systems are known to lead
to high unemployment rates and are
costly both from a fiscal perspective
and for a society as a whole. Andreas
Poliak
unemployment insurance system
would look like, i.e. a system that
constitutes the best possible com¬
promise between income security
and incentives to work. Using eco¬
nomic and econometric models, he
studies the effects of benefit levels
and payment durations on unemploy¬
ment and welfare. Numerical simu¬
lations are used to compute efficient
insurance schemes under various
assumptions.
Andreas
economic methods to study the optimal design
of an unemployment insurance system. He gives
policy recommendations concerning the level and
duration of unemployment benefits and evaluates
the recent German
9«783Í
ISBN 978-3-16-149304-1
Mohr Siebeck
Andreas Pollak
economic methods to study the optimal design
of an unemployment insurance system. He gives
policy recommendations concerning the level and
duration of unemployment benefits and evaluates
the recent German
|
| adam_txt |
Table
Chapter
1.1
1.2
Chapter
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
Chapter
and Human Capital
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.4
3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2 Hartz
3.5.3
3.6
Chapter
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.3
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.4
Chapter
Equilibrium Model
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.1.5
5.1.6
5.1.7
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.2.5
5.3
Chapter
6.1
6.2
Appendix
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
Table of
References
Author
Index
Designing a
insurance scheme is a delicate matter.
In a system with no or little in¬
surance, households may be subject
to a high income risk, whereas ex¬
cessively generous unemployment
insurance systems are known to lead
to high unemployment rates and are
costly both from a fiscal perspective
and for a society as a whole. Andreas
Poliak
unemployment insurance system
would look like, i.e. a system that
constitutes the best possible com¬
promise between income security
and incentives to work. Using eco¬
nomic and econometric models, he
studies the effects of benefit levels
and payment durations on unemploy¬
ment and welfare. Numerical simu¬
lations are used to compute efficient
insurance schemes under various
assumptions.
Andreas
economic methods to study the optimal design
of an unemployment insurance system. He gives
policy recommendations concerning the level and
duration of unemployment benefits and evaluates
the recent German
9«783Í
ISBN 978-3-16-149304-1
Mohr Siebeck
Andreas Pollak
economic methods to study the optimal design
of an unemployment insurance system. He gives
policy recommendations concerning the level and
duration of unemployment benefits and evaluates
the recent German |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Pollak, Andreas 1978- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)13312424X |
| author_facet | Pollak, Andreas 1978- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Pollak, Andreas 1978- |
| author_variant | a p ap |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022443084 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HD7095 |
| callnumber-raw | HD7095 |
| callnumber-search | HD7095 |
| callnumber-sort | HD 47095 |
| callnumber-subject | HD - Industries, Land Use, Labor |
| classification_rvk | QX 600 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)133047947 (DE-599)DNB98395383X |
| dewey-full | 368.4401 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 368 - Insurance |
| dewey-raw | 368.4401 |
| dewey-search | 368.4401 |
| dewey-sort | 3368.4401 |
| dewey-tens | 360 - Social problems and services; associations |
| discipline | Soziologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Soziologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Thesis Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02648nam a2200601 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV022443084</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20191002 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070529s2007 gw d||| m||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="015" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">07,N20,0585</subfield><subfield code="2">dnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="016" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">98395383X</subfield><subfield code="2">DE-101</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783161493041</subfield><subfield code="c">Ln. : EUR 79.00 (freier Pr.)</subfield><subfield code="9">978-3-16-149304-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783161493041</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)133047947</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DNB98395383X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">gw</subfield><subfield code="c">XA-DE-BW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HD7095</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">368.4401</subfield><subfield code="2">22/ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QX 600</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)142184:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">360</subfield><subfield code="2">sdnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="2">sdnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Pollak, Andreas</subfield><subfield code="d">1978-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)13312424X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Optimal unemployment insurance</subfield><subfield code="c">Andreas Pollak</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Tübingen</subfield><subfield code="b">Mohr Siebeck</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">IX, 178 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft</subfield><subfield code="v">[3. Folge],24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="502" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zugl.: Freiburg, Univ., Diss., 2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Unemployment insurance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Unemployment insurance</subfield><subfield code="x">Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Agency-Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4126353-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Adverse Selektion</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4382291-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Arbeitsmarkttheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4122827-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Arbeitslosenversicherung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4137265-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Moral Hazard</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4322425-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113937-9</subfield><subfield code="a">Hochschulschrift</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Arbeitslosenversicherung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4137265-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Arbeitsmarkttheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4122827-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Agency-Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4126353-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Moral Hazard</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4322425-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Adverse Selektion</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4382291-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft</subfield><subfield code="v">[3. Folge],24</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV021455684</subfield><subfield code="9">200024</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung UB Regensburg</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung UB Regensburg</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Klappentext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015651099</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| id | DE-604.BV022443084 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T17:33:21Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:57:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783161493041 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015651099 |
| oclc_num | 133047947 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-384 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-384 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 DE-M382 |
| physical | IX, 178 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Mohr Siebeck |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft |
| series2 | Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft |
| spelling | Pollak, Andreas 1978- Verfasser (DE-588)13312424X aut Optimal unemployment insurance Andreas Pollak Tübingen Mohr Siebeck 2007 IX, 178 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft [3. Folge],24 Zugl.: Freiburg, Univ., Diss., 2006 Mathematisches Modell Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Mathematical models Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 gnd rswk-swf Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 gnd rswk-swf Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 gnd rswk-swf Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 s Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 s Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 s DE-604 Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft [3. Folge],24 (DE-604)BV021455684 200024 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Pollak, Andreas 1978- Optimal unemployment insurance Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft Mathematisches Modell Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Mathematical models Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 gnd Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 gnd Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4382291-5 (DE-588)4122827-3 (DE-588)4137265-7 (DE-588)4322425-8 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Optimal unemployment insurance |
| title_auth | Optimal unemployment insurance |
| title_exact_search | Optimal unemployment insurance |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Optimal unemployment insurance |
| title_full | Optimal unemployment insurance Andreas Pollak |
| title_fullStr | Optimal unemployment insurance Andreas Pollak |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal unemployment insurance Andreas Pollak |
| title_short | Optimal unemployment insurance |
| title_sort | optimal unemployment insurance |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Mathematical models Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Adverse Selektion (DE-588)4382291-5 gnd Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 gnd Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Mathematical models Agency-Theorie Adverse Selektion Arbeitsmarkttheorie Arbeitslosenversicherung Moral Hazard Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015651099&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV021455684 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pollakandreas optimalunemploymentinsurance |