Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships von Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry 1953-

Inhaltsverzeichnis

When do regulators close banks when should they? von Mailath, George J., Mester, Loretta J.

Correlated equilibria as network equilibria von Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry 1953-, Shaked, Avner

A positive analysis of bank closure von Mailath, George J., Mester, Loretta J.

When do regulators close banks when should they von Mailath, George J., Mester, Loretta J.

When the punishment must fit the crime remarks on the failure of simple penal codes in extensive-form games von Mailath, George J., Nocke, Volker, White, Lucy 1972-

Structural indifference in normal form games von Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry 1953-, Swinkels, Jeroen M.