Pricing and welfare in health plan choice:
"Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and esti...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2008
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
14153 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site |
| Beschreibung: | 36, [14] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 520 | 8 | |a "Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Levin, Jonathan D. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mahoney, Neale |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
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| id | DE-604.BV023594030 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:33Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 36, [14] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Bundorf, M. Kate Verfasser (DE-588)128796936 aut Pricing and welfare in health plan choice M. Kate Bundorf ; Jonathan D. Levin ; Neale Mahoney Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008 36, [14] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 14153 "Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site Levin, Jonathan D. Verfasser aut Mahoney, Neale Verfasser aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 14153 (DE-604)BV002801238 14153 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14153.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bundorf, M. Kate Levin, Jonathan D. Mahoney, Neale Pricing and welfare in health plan choice |
| title | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice |
| title_auth | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice |
| title_exact_search | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice |
| title_full | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice M. Kate Bundorf ; Jonathan D. Levin ; Neale Mahoney |
| title_fullStr | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice M. Kate Bundorf ; Jonathan D. Levin ; Neale Mahoney |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice M. Kate Bundorf ; Jonathan D. Levin ; Neale Mahoney |
| title_short | Pricing and welfare in health plan choice |
| title_sort | pricing and welfare in health plan choice |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14153.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bundorfmkate pricingandwelfareinhealthplanchoice AT levinjonathand pricingandwelfareinhealthplanchoice AT mahoneyneale pricingandwelfareinhealthplanchoice |