Rational sentimentalism:
"Rational Sentimentalism develops a novel theory of the sentimental values. These values, which include the funny, the disgusting, and the shameful, are profoundly important because they set standards for emotional responses that are part of our shared human nature. Yet moral philosophers have...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2023
|
| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Rational Sentimentalism develops a novel theory of the sentimental values. These values, which include the funny, the disgusting, and the shameful, are profoundly important because they set standards for emotional responses that are part of our shared human nature. Yet moral philosophers have neglected them relative to their prominent role in human mental life. he theory is sentimentalist because it holds that these values are emotion-dependent-contrary to some prominent accounts of the funny and the disgusting. Its rational aspect arises from its insistence that the shameful (for example) is not whatever elicits shame but what makes shame fitting. Shameful traits provide reasons to be ashamed that do not depend on whether one is disposed to be ashamed of them. Furthermore, these reasons to be ashamed transmit to reasons to act as shame dictates: to conceal. Sentimentalism requires a compatible theory of emotion and emotional fittingness. This book explicates a motivational theory of emotion that explains the peculiarities of emotional motivation as other theories cannot. It argues that a class of emotions are psychological kinds with a similar goal across cultures despite differences in their elicitors. It then develops an account of fittingness that helps to differentiate reasons of fit, which bear on the sentimental values, from other considerations for or against having an emotion.Significant and controversial conclusions emerge from this theory of rational sentimentalism. Sentimental values conflict with one another, and with morality, but nevertheless provide practical reasons that apply to humans-if not to all rational agents. Significant and controversial conclusions emerge from this theory of rational sentimentalism. Sentimental values conflict with one another, and with morality, but nevertheless provide practical reasons that apply to humans-if not to all rational agents"-- |
| Beschreibung: | XII, 230 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780199256402 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "Rational Sentimentalism develops a novel theory of the sentimental values. These values, which include the funny, the disgusting, and the shameful, are profoundly important because they set standards for emotional responses that are part of our shared human nature. Yet moral philosophers have neglected them relative to their prominent role in human mental life. he theory is sentimentalist because it holds that these values are emotion-dependent-contrary to some prominent accounts of the funny and the disgusting. Its rational aspect arises from its insistence that the shameful (for example) is not whatever elicits shame but what makes shame fitting. Shameful traits provide reasons to be ashamed that do not depend on whether one is disposed to be ashamed of them. Furthermore, these reasons to be ashamed transmit to reasons to act as shame dictates: to conceal. Sentimentalism requires a compatible theory of emotion and emotional fittingness. This book explicates a motivational theory of emotion that explains the peculiarities of emotional motivation as other theories cannot. It argues that a class of emotions are psychological kinds with a similar goal across cultures despite differences in their elicitors. It then develops an account of fittingness that helps to differentiate reasons of fit, which bear on the sentimental values, from other considerations for or against having an emotion.Significant and controversial conclusions emerge from this theory of rational sentimentalism. Sentimental values conflict with one another, and with morality, but nevertheless provide practical reasons that apply to humans-if not to all rational agents. Significant and controversial conclusions emerge from this theory of rational sentimentalism. Sentimental values conflict with one another, and with morality, but nevertheless provide practical reasons that apply to humans-if not to all rational agents"-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text |
Contents PARTI. SENTIMENTALVALUES AND ANTHROPOCENTRIC REASONS 1. Sentimental Values 1.1. The Grip of Sentimental Values 1.2. Rational Sentimentalism: A Theory of the Sentimental Values 3 3 13 2. Sentimentalism 2.1. Sentiments and the Instability of Affect 2.2. The Failure of Response-Independent Accounts 23 23 31 3. Sentimentalism and Scientism 3.1. Singer’s Dilemma: The Case for Pessimism 3.2. Rationalization and Anthropocentric Reasons 3.3. Sentimentalism without Relativism 3.4. The Reasons that Elude Scientism 40 40 46 51 56 4. Reasons for Emotions 4.1. Sentimental Value Concepts 4.2. Sentimental Value Judgments: Context and Qualification 4.3. Fundamental Disagreement and Convergence in Sensibility 63 63 71 77 PART II. EMOTIONS AND FITTINGNESS 5. Sentimentalism versus Cognitivism 5.1. Foot’s Challenge 5.2. Carving Emotions at the Joints 89 89 96 6. The Motivational Theory of Emotion 6.1. An Overview of the Theory 6.2. Emotional Motivation: What Unifies the Natural Emotions 6.3. Emotions as Episodes, as Dispositions, and as Attitudes 105 105 116 126 7. Emotional Fittingness for Sentimentalists 7.1. Fittingness without Cognitivism 7.2. Glossing the Emotions: Shame and Pride 136 136 143
xii CONTENTS PART III. MORALITY, CONFLICT, AND CONSTRAINT 8. Pluralism and Moralism 8.1. The Moralistic Fallacy 8.2. The Opacity of Normative Force 8.3. Conflict and Virtue 155 155 164 175 9. The Importance of Sentimental Values 9.1. Anthropocentric Values, Pluralism, and Moralism 9.2. АП Natural Emotions Are Sometimes Fitting 9.3. From Fitting Anger to Retributive Reasons 9.4. Guilt and Wrongness 182 182 185 192 203 Bibliography Index 213 227 |
| adam_txt |
Contents PARTI. SENTIMENTALVALUES AND ANTHROPOCENTRIC REASONS 1. Sentimental Values 1.1. The Grip of Sentimental Values 1.2. Rational Sentimentalism: A Theory of the Sentimental Values 3 3 13 2. Sentimentalism 2.1. Sentiments and the Instability of Affect 2.2. The Failure of Response-Independent Accounts 23 23 31 3. Sentimentalism and Scientism 3.1. Singer’s Dilemma: The Case for Pessimism 3.2. Rationalization and Anthropocentric Reasons 3.3. Sentimentalism without Relativism 3.4. The Reasons that Elude Scientism 40 40 46 51 56 4. Reasons for Emotions 4.1. Sentimental Value Concepts 4.2. Sentimental Value Judgments: Context and Qualification 4.3. Fundamental Disagreement and Convergence in Sensibility 63 63 71 77 PART II. EMOTIONS AND FITTINGNESS 5. Sentimentalism versus Cognitivism 5.1. Foot’s Challenge 5.2. Carving Emotions at the Joints 89 89 96 6. The Motivational Theory of Emotion 6.1. An Overview of the Theory 6.2. Emotional Motivation: What Unifies the Natural Emotions 6.3. Emotions as Episodes, as Dispositions, and as Attitudes 105 105 116 126 7. Emotional Fittingness for Sentimentalists 7.1. Fittingness without Cognitivism 7.2. Glossing the Emotions: Shame and Pride 136 136 143
xii CONTENTS PART III. MORALITY, CONFLICT, AND CONSTRAINT 8. Pluralism and Moralism 8.1. The Moralistic Fallacy 8.2. The Opacity of Normative Force 8.3. Conflict and Virtue 155 155 164 175 9. The Importance of Sentimental Values 9.1. Anthropocentric Values, Pluralism, and Moralism 9.2. АП Natural Emotions Are Sometimes Fitting 9.3. From Fitting Anger to Retributive Reasons 9.4. Guilt and Wrongness 182 182 185 192 203 Bibliography Index 213 227 |
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| author | D'Arms, Justin Jacobson, Daniel 1923- |
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| discipline | Philosophie |
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| edition | First edition |
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| id | DE-604.BV049047327 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:20:36Z |
| indexdate | 2024-10-23T10:07:59Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780199256402 |
| language | English |
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| physical | XII, 230 Seiten 24 cm |
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| spelling | D'Arms, Justin Verfasser (DE-588)1061140385 aut Rational sentimentalism Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2023 XII, 230 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "Rational Sentimentalism develops a novel theory of the sentimental values. These values, which include the funny, the disgusting, and the shameful, are profoundly important because they set standards for emotional responses that are part of our shared human nature. Yet moral philosophers have neglected them relative to their prominent role in human mental life. he theory is sentimentalist because it holds that these values are emotion-dependent-contrary to some prominent accounts of the funny and the disgusting. Its rational aspect arises from its insistence that the shameful (for example) is not whatever elicits shame but what makes shame fitting. Shameful traits provide reasons to be ashamed that do not depend on whether one is disposed to be ashamed of them. Furthermore, these reasons to be ashamed transmit to reasons to act as shame dictates: to conceal. Sentimentalism requires a compatible theory of emotion and emotional fittingness. This book explicates a motivational theory of emotion that explains the peculiarities of emotional motivation as other theories cannot. It argues that a class of emotions are psychological kinds with a similar goal across cultures despite differences in their elicitors. It then develops an account of fittingness that helps to differentiate reasons of fit, which bear on the sentimental values, from other considerations for or against having an emotion.Significant and controversial conclusions emerge from this theory of rational sentimentalism. Sentimental values conflict with one another, and with morality, but nevertheless provide practical reasons that apply to humans-if not to all rational agents. Significant and controversial conclusions emerge from this theory of rational sentimentalism. Sentimental values conflict with one another, and with morality, but nevertheless provide practical reasons that apply to humans-if not to all rational agents"-- Psychologie (DE-588)4047704-6 gnd rswk-swf Sentimentalität (DE-588)4181008-9 gnd rswk-swf Gefühl (DE-588)4019702-5 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd rswk-swf Emotions (Philosophy) Emotions / Moral and ethical aspects Affect (Psychology) / Philosophy Ethics / Psychological aspects Gefühl (DE-588)4019702-5 s Sentimentalität (DE-588)4181008-9 s Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 s Psychologie (DE-588)4047704-6 s DE-604 Jacobson, Daniel 1923- (DE-588)1149160853 aut Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034309745&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | D'Arms, Justin Jacobson, Daniel 1923- Rational sentimentalism Psychologie (DE-588)4047704-6 gnd Sentimentalität (DE-588)4181008-9 gnd Gefühl (DE-588)4019702-5 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd |
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| title | Rational sentimentalism |
| title_auth | Rational sentimentalism |
| title_exact_search | Rational sentimentalism |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Rational sentimentalism |
| title_full | Rational sentimentalism Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson |
| title_fullStr | Rational sentimentalism Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rational sentimentalism Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson |
| title_short | Rational sentimentalism |
| title_sort | rational sentimentalism |
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