Trade-offs in bank resolution.:

This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequenc...

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Körperschaft: International Monetary Fund
Weitere Verfasser: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad, Igan, Deniz, Awadzi, Elsie Addo, Dobler, Marc, Sandri, Damiano
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, [2018]
Schriftenreihe:Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ; no. 18/02.
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Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequences of bail-outs and the systemic spillovers from bail-ins.
Beschreibung:1 online resource (42 pages) : color illustrations
ISBN:148434149X
9781484341490
1484341007
9781484341001

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