Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior:
We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Mannheim, Germany
ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
2021
|
| Schriftenreihe: | ZEW discussion papers
21-025 (03/2021) |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others’ dishonesty (With and Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment. Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs is accounted for. Third, social information and payoffs do not interact with each other. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) Diagramme |
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| 520 | 3 | |a We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others’ dishonesty (With and Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment. Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs is accounted for. Third, social information and payoffs do not interact with each other. | |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T16:55:46Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:05:53Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2021 |
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| publisher | ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research |
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| spelling | Le Maux, Benoît Verfasser (DE-588)140638237 aut Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior Benoît Le Maux, David Masclet, and Sarah Necker Mannheim, Germany ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research 2021 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier ZEW discussion papers 21-025 (03/2021) We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others’ dishonesty (With and Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment. Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs is accounted for. Third, social information and payoffs do not interact with each other. David Masclet Verfasser aut Necker, Sarah 1982- Verfasser (DE-588)1019265094 aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ZEW discussion papers 21-025 (03/2021) (DE-604)BV046176481 21-025 (03/2021) http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21025.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Le Maux, Benoît David Masclet Necker, Sarah 1982- Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior ZEW discussion papers |
| title | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior |
| title_auth | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior |
| title_exact_search | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior |
| title_full | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior Benoît Le Maux, David Masclet, and Sarah Necker |
| title_fullStr | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior Benoît Le Maux, David Masclet, and Sarah Necker |
| title_full_unstemmed | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior Benoît Le Maux, David Masclet, and Sarah Necker |
| title_short | Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior |
| title_sort | monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behvior |
| url | http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21025.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV046176481 |
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